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Abstract This paper uses information from a panel of Dutch firms to investi-
gate the labor productivity effects of performance related pay (PRP). We find
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that PRP increases productivity at the firm level with 9% and employment
growth with 5%.
Keywords Performance related pay · Labor productivity
JEL Classifications C41 · H55 · J64 · J65
1 Introduction
Recent developments, such as globalization, have led to increased competition
in several markets. In order to face this fierce competition, firms are contin-
uously looking for ways to improve the productivity of their workforce. A
popular instrument is performance related pay (PRP), which may stimulate
labor productivity for two reasons. First, in situations of asymmetric informa-
tion about worker’s abilities or effort a PRP-scheme can be used to induce
workers to exert the right amount of effort (see for example Prendergast 1999
and Lazear 2004). Second, when hiring new workers, piece rates can be used
as a screening mechanism to encourage only the most able workers to apply
(Lazear 1986).
Over the past decade in the Netherlands the use of performance related
pay has increased substantially from 30% in 1995 to 39% in 2001 (Table 1).
This paper investigates the effect of PRP on the productivity and employment
of Dutch firms. In our analysis we account for potential selectivity of PRP-
adoption, i.e. the case in which more profitable firms are more likely to
introduce performance related pay. Our results indicate that PRP increases
productivity substantially. This productivity increase may lower marginal costs
of producing, which will result in the hiring of additional workers. We also
find evidence that the introduction of PRP affects worker flows, with a net
Table 1 Presence of PRP in
Dutch firms (%)
Source: OSA Labor Demand
Survey. Sampling weights are
used to create numbers that
are representative for firm
establishments with at least 5
workers
1995 1997 1999 2001 No. of firms
Total 30 35 40 39 2786
By firm size
<25 32 36 40 35 1037
25–50 29 36 33 49 375
51–100 21 31 46 48 399
>100 29 29 40 53 975
By industry
Manufacturing, 30 34 38 45 738
agriculture
Construction 44 56 56 55 308
Trade 36 36 45 41 255
Transportation 16 14 20 39 83
Financial services 31 42 44 36 242
Health care 13 6 7 10 593
Other services 21 29 25 35 137
Government 47 48 40 38 224
Education 14 8 13 9 206
No. of firms 763 932 722 369 2786
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positive effect on employment. The contribution of this paper to the literature
is threefold. First, we add to the small number of studies that investigate the
productivity effect of PRP using firm level panel data. Sofar, this was done on
a case study basis only (Lazear 2000; Paarsch and Shearer 2000). Second, we
show the importance of selection in productivity studies. Finally, we investigate
the effect of PRP on employment, distinguishing between the effects on inflow
and outflow of workers. We are not aware of previous studies that considered
these effects.
The set-up of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief overview of
previous empirical literature on performance pay and productivity. Section 3
presents our data and in Section 4 we discuss the determinants of PRP.
Section 5 contains the results of our empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature overview
PRP can be either an individual scheme, such as a piece rate wage, or a
collective scheme, such as profit sharing. Despite the potentially positive
productivity effects, PRP may not always increase productivity. In case of
teamwork, individual performance is difficult to measure, hence there is an
incentive to free-ride. In such a case, group-based incentive schemes may have
little effect on individual productivity. Additionally, perverse incentives may
arise in case of multitasking. When employees are required to perform several
tasks, they will focus only on those activities being rewarded and neglecting
other activities. Therefore it is not always clear that the introduction of a PRP-
scheme will indeed increase productivity.
Some empirical studies on the productivity effects of PRP use information
from worker surveys. However, in these surveys, detailed information about
productivity is mostly absent. Therefore, wage information is used, a rather
crude indicator of individual productivity. For the US, studies using the NLSY
data show that PRP is associated with about 5 percent higher wages (e.g. Ewing
1996; Armuedo-Dorantes and Mach 2003). Booth and Frank (1999), using
British data find slightly larger effects of 9 percent for men and 6 percent for
women.
The lack of an appropriate productivity indicator in worker surveys has
given rise to a branch of literature where detailed information from a single
firm is used to estimate the productivity effects of PRP. Examples are case
studies by Lazear (2000) and Paarsch and Shearer (2000), who find that the
introduction of piece rate schemes increased the productivity by 40 and 23
percent, respectively. However these results only hold for the respective firms,
and may not be valid for other firms.
Productivity effects estimated in studies that use representative firm surveys
are much smaller. An early study by Kruse (1992) finds that the adoption of
profit sharing in US manufacturing firms is associated with a 2.8–3.5 percent
productivity increase, while for non-manufacturing companies the increase
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was about 2.5–4.2 percent.1 When profit sharing is measured as proportion
of employees covered, the estimated increase is 7.9–8.9 percent and 10.3–11.0
percent, respectively. Similar studies for UK engineering firms (Cable and
Wilson 1989) and French manufacturing firms (Cahuc and Dormont 1997) find
that the introduction of profit sharing arrangements raises productivity by 3–8
percent and 2 percent, respectively.
Introducing PRP may affect productivity for two reasons (Lazear 1986). It
may extract the right amount of effort from workers – the incentive effect – and
it may be used as a screening device to encourage only the most able workers
to apply – the sorting effect. Lazear (2000) finds that half of the piece rate
induced increase in productivity is due to the incentive effect while the other
half is due to the sorting effect, i.e. the inflow of high-productivity workers.
Similar incentive and sorting effects are found in Paarsch and Shearer (2000).
3 Data
The OSA Labor Demand Panel is a biennial panel firm survey representative
for establishments in the Netherlands with at least 5 employees.2 This dataset
is a refreshment panel for which all organizations that have participated in
one wave are approached again two years later for participation in the next
wave. Organizations that cannot be contacted or refuse further cooperation3
are replaced by a stratified random refreshment sample. The data we use in our
empirical analysis are from four consecutive waves covering the period 1995–
2001. In our data 791 establishments are observed twice, 288 three times, 84
four times. The dataset comprises all industries with the sample stratified with
respect to the area of economic activity and firm size.4
For each firm in the panel we know whether or not a PRP scheme is
used. The respondent is asked whether “there is a performance-related pay
of any kind in the organization”. Unfortunately, we do not know how many
workers in the firm receive PRP. Therefore, our PRP-variable is a dummy
variable indicating whether or not performance-related payments occur in the
firm. Additionally, the dataset contains information on sales and production
costs. Respondents in the private sector were asked “if sales measure the
1The empirical literature shows that generally profit sharing arrangement have smaller productiv-
ity effects than piece rate schemes. This may have to do with piece rate schemes being applicable
only in situations in which individual output can be monitored easily.
2In this paper we will use the terms establishment and firm interchangeably to describe the unit of
analysis. The exclusion of such small firms excludes 11 percent of the Dutch labor force, but the
prevalence of PRP (denoted as the share of the total wage) is not being different than for workers
in larger firms (Arbeidsinspectie 2003).
3The panel attrition rate is approximately 40 percent between two waves, 4 percent of which is due
to firms closing down or being restructured as a result of a merger or split-up. In the analysis we
assume attrition is not selective with respect to the endogenous variables in the application.
4We use sampling weights to obtain figures that are representative for Dutch establishments with
5 or more employees.
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volume of all activities in financial terms, what is the level of the sales
this year?” Subsequently, they had to report “the percentage of sales that
consists of supplies (raw materials, semi-manufactured articles, intermediary
supplies and services, outsourcing) that were purchased from other suppliers”.
Organizations in the non-profit sector were asked to report their “budget”
rather than sales, and the “percentage of the budget that consists of purchased
products and services, including outsourcing?”. The information on sales and
production costs together with the number of employees used to obtain this
sales volume allows the construction of a measure of per capita value added.
Finally, for each firm we have information about the size of worker inflow and
outflow on the firm level.5
4 Determinants of PRP
Table 1 provides some stylized facts on the presence of PRP. As shown
especially firms with more than 50 employees increased the use of PRP-
schemes; from 29% in 1995 to 53% in 2001. Although there is quite some
variation in the use of PRP-schemes according to the size of the firm, there is
even more variation across industry. These results illustrate the importance of
our data, which controls for this variation across industries in the Netherlands,
whereas earlier studies using firm level data are rare and, if present, only focus
on one particular firm.
Estimates on the presence of PRP in firms using our data as a pooled cross
section indicate that PRP schemes are more likely to be adopted in large
firms and in the construction sector.6 In industries where output is difficult
to measure, e.g. health care sector, PRP schemes are less likely to be adopted.
Furthermore, during the late 1990s the use of PRP schemes has increased.
To correct for potential selection effects, a logit model is estimated account-
ing for firm fixed effects: Pr(Pit = 1) = (αi + βxit) and Pr(Pit = 0) = (−αi −
βxit), where P indicates whether or not a firm has a PRP scheme, x is a vector
of explanatory variables including firm size and calendar year,  is an indicator
of the logistic cumulative distribution function, i refers to firm, t refers to the
year (1995,..., 2001) and the αi represent firm fixed effects. Because of the fixed
effects many firms characteristics – all non time-varying characteristics – are
accounted for. The parameters are estimated using Chamberlain’s conditional
likelihood method. This means that the parameters are identified on the subset
of observations for which the dependent variable changes at least once over
time.
5It would be interesting to investigate the wage effects of PRP, but unfortunately our dataset lacks
appropriate wage information.
6These estimates using a binomial logit model are not presented, but are available on request. In
the pooled cross-section estimates we also find that PRP schemes are more likely to be present in
firms with a high share of employees covered by a collective agreement and in firms with a high
share of white collar workers.
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Table 2 PRP and productivity
Presence of PRP Labor productivity
P – 0.090 (0.042) ∗ ∗
ln(firm size) 0.397 (0.266) −0.881 (0.048) ∗ ∗
1997 0.128 (0.144) 0.130 (0.031) ∗ ∗
1999 0.521 (0.181) ∗ ∗ 0.164 (0.037) ∗ ∗
2001 0.688 (0.225) ∗ ∗ 0.160 (0.048) ∗ ∗
Observations 895 2786
Firms 356 1164
Note: Presence of PRP: logit model; Labor productivity: linear regression; all estimates contain
firm fixed effects; standard errors in parentheses, a ** indicates that the coefficient is different
from zero at a 5% level of significance; reference year is 1995
The parameter estimates are presented in the first column of Table 2. The
results indicate that the effect of firm size is insignificant. Apparently, the firm
size effect is more a cross-sectional phenomenon than a direct causal effect.
There is a clear increase in the use of PRP over time.
5 Effects of PRP
5.1 Labor productivity
In this section we determine the effect of PRP on productivity of firms. In
particular, this paper is the first to investigate the importance of a selection
effect in the productivity effects of PRP.
Direct comparison of firms that have a PRP-scheme to those that have not
shows that labor productivity is on average 41% higher in the first group.
This difference may however be partially due to selectivity of PRP-adoption,
resulting in a different composition of both groups with respect to observed
and unobserved characteristics of the firms. To account for these differences
we estimate a multivariate regression model that exploits the fact that we
have repeated observations for most of the firms. Productivity y in firm i
and calendar year t is calculated as: yit = sit ∗ (1 − mit)/eit, where s represents
sales,7 m the percentage of costs in sales, and e the number of employees of the
firm. We estimate the following relationship:
ln(yit) = γi + γt + β1Pit + β2ln(eit) + εit (1)
where γi is a vector of firm fixed effects, and γt a vector of calendar time
fixed effects. Furthermore, the β’s are parameters and ε is an error term.
We include firm fixed effects in the analysis to control for selectivity in the
7Sales are denoted in 1995 Dutch guilders; for public sector firms, s indicates budget rather than
sales.
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use of PRP schemes.8 The parameter estimates are presented in the second
column of Table 2. It appears that PRP schemes increase productivity with
9.0%.9 Furthermore, firm size has a negative effect on productivity,10 while
firms become more productive over time.
To investigate the robustness of the PRP productivity effect we performed a
detailed sensitivity analysis. As a first variation we have omitted the firm fixed
effects and estimated a pooled cross-section model, ignoring the longitudinal
character of the data. If no panel data are available it is impossible to distin-
guish between the incentive effects of PRP and spurious correlation between
PRP and productivity that will typically arise if more productive firms are
more likely to adopt a PRP scheme. As a result of this potential endogeneity
of the PRP variable the estimated effect of PRP would be biased upwards.
Indeed, as shown in Table 3, in the pooled cross-section the PRP-productivity
effect is estimated as 12.4%.11 Next, we estimated a model in which the firm
specific effects were included as random effects. This specification implicitly
assumes that PRP can be treated as an exogenous variable in the sense that
PRP-adoption is not related to firm-specific characteristics that are related
to higher productivity. As in the pooled regression, the effect of PRP will
be overestimated if PRP-adoption is subject to endogenous selection. This
expectation is confirmed. Testing the fixed effects specification against the
random effects specification, we find that the fixed effects model is to be
preferred.12
Furthermore, we noticed that there was a lot of variation in the reported
sales figures indicating potential measurement errors. In order to reduce
measurement errors we excluded observations with a large change in sales
between two panel observations. We used an indicator variable z defined as
zit = ln(sit) − ln(si) where si is the average sales of firm i over the time period
available. First, we remove observations for which |zit| > 1. This reduces the
sample size but does not affect the productivity effect of PRP in the fixed
8Additional checks to investigate whether selection into PRP is correlated with other organiza-
tional changes (change in skill and age composition of the workforce) show that there is no such
relationship.
9The results are significant both for private and public sector firms.
10The negative effect of firm size in the panel analysis is most likely a short term effect. If firms
expand their workforce in the short run productivity goes down.
11In these estimates we find that large firms are more productive than small firms. Apparently, in
the long run productivity is positively correlated with the size of the workforce. These pooled cross-
section estimates already control for the spurious correlation caused by differences in the variables
that are included in the model. Including these variables in the regression therefore reduces the
PRP coefficient from 41% to 12.4%, demonstrating that the larger part of the 41% difference
in labor productivity between firms with PRP and firms without PRP should be attributed to
differences in observed firm characteristics.
12The Hausman test of the random effects specification against the fixed effects specification
is 100.95. This is a χ2-test with 5 degrees of freedom and firmly rejects the random effects
specification indicating that the firm specific effects are correlated with the PRP variable.
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Table 3 Sensitivity analysis productivity effects
PRP parameter No. of observations
Baseline estimate 0.090 (0.042)** 2786
Pooled cross-section 0.125 (0.044)** 2786
Random effects 0.176 (0.039)** 2786
No outliers (|zit| < 1) 0.089 (0.041)** 2773
No outliers (|zit| < 0.5) 0.091 (0.039)** 2663
Hourly productivity 0.156 (0.088)* 1318
Private vs public sector
PRP - private sector (|zit| < 0.5) 0.077 (0.045)* 2663
PRP - public sector (|zit| < 0.5) 0.142 (0.083)*
Note: The baseline estimate is similar to the one presented in Table 2; standard errors in
parentheses, a ** (*) indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at a 5% (10%) level of
significance
effects specification. Applying a more strict criterion of removing observations
for which |zit| > 0.5 does not change the results either.
Finally, we re-estimated the model correcting for the average number of
working hours in the firm. Hence, we used an indicator of productivity per
hour worked. This leads to less accurate estimates for two reasons. First,
the information on the working hours is available only for a limited number
of firms. Second, the average number of hours is rather imprecise as it is
measured in categories. As shown, now the PRP-parameter is estimated with
less precision but, as shown in the bottom line of Table 3, still significantly
different from zero at 10%.
In the bottom part of the table we distinguish between productivity effects
in private sector and public sector firms. Because the number of observations
for each of the subgroups is relatively low, measurement error is more likely to
affect the results. Therefore, we use only those observations for which |zit| <
0.5. It appears that both effects are not significantly different. When the model
is re-estimated without the restriction that |zit| < 0.5 both effects are still not
significantly different.
All in all, we conclude from our sensitivity analysis that the estimated
productivity effect of PRP of 9% is quite robust.
5.2 Worker flows
The PRP induced productivity increase may be the result of an incentive effect
as well as a sorting effect (Lazear 1986). If worker sorting occurs, we expect
to find an effect of PRP on worker flows. Furthermore, Table 3 illustrates that
that hourly productivity goes up more strongly than overall firm productivity
after the introduction of PRP. This shows that the number of working hours
increased and because of working hours regulations this implies that additional
workers have been hired. To investigate this we estimate worker inflow and
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Table 4 Effects on worker flows
Inflow Outflow ρ -Loglikelihood Observations
A. Baseline model
Pt 3.86 (1.53)** 1.24 (1.10) – – 1235
Pt−1 1.27 (1.52) 0.50 (1.09) 0.66 (0.02)** 8783.2
B. Restricted modela
Pt 4.38 (1.40)** 1.44 (1.00) 0.66 (0.02)** 8783.6 1235
C. No lagged effects
Pt 6.39 (1.39)** 1.54 (0.69)** 0.54 (0.02)** 16265.2 2112
D. Restricted modelb
Pt 1.25 (0.69)** 1.25 (0.69)** 0.54 (0.02)** 16270.9 2112
aImposing that the lagged PRP-effects equal zero
bImposing that the PRP-effect on the inflow equals the PRP-effect on the outflow.
Note: Worker flows: bivariate Tobit model, other explanatory variables are log of firm size and
dummies for calendar year and sector; a ** indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at a
5% level of significance
worker outflow simultaneously using a bivariate Tobit model, such that einit =
max[0, einit ∗] and eoutit = max[0, eoutit ∗], with:
einit
∗ = γ inj + γ int + δ1 Pit + δ2 Pi,t−1 + γ ine ln(eit) + εinit (2)
eoutit
∗ = γ outj + γ outt + δ3 Pit + δ4 Pi,t−1 + γ oute ln(eit) + εoutit (3)
where ein is the inflow rate and eout is the outflow rate with the δ’s as our
parameters of interest. Furthermore the γ j’s are fixed effects for industries,
the γt’s are fixed effects for calendar years, the γe’s are parameters indicating
the effect of firm size and the error terms are assumed to be jointly normally
distributed with ρ = Cov[εin, εout]. Since we expect worker flows to react
gradually to the introduction of PRP, we also include a dummy variable for
the presence of PRP lagged one period.
Table 4 presents the estimation results. The results in panel A indicate
that worker inflow increases by almost 4 percentage points right after the
introduction of PRP. In the long run worker inflow is 5 percentage points
higher than in firms without PRP. Furthermore, worker outflow increases
by more than 1 percentage points initially, and increases in the long run by
almost 2 percentage points. However, the parameter estimates for the lagged
presence of PRP are insignificantly different from zero. The results in panel
B indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the lagged effects are
equal to zero.13 Because we can ignore lagged PRP-effects our sample size
increases substantially. Panel C shows that the introduction of PRP increases
the inflow with 6.4% while it increases the outflow with 1.5%. Apparently,
the introduction of PRP increases employment growth with almost 5%. To
13The Likelihood Ratio test statistic equals 0.8.
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investigate whether indeed there is permanent employment growth in panel D
we impose the PRP-effects on the inflow and outflow to be of the same size.
From a Likelihood Ratio test it appears that we cannot accept the hypothesis
that the introduction of PRP does not affect employment growth.14
All in all, the introduction of PRP induces worker reallocation which could
be evidence of the worker sorting effect predicted by Lazear (1986). Although
we cannot observe whether the average ability of worker inflow differs from
that of worker outflow we consider this possibility to be very likely. If not, why
would worker reallocation occur at all?
6 Conclusions
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the productivity and employment
effects of PRP. We find that the introduction of PRP increases productivity of
firms with about 9%. This may be partly due to an incentive effect and partly
due to worker sorting. The increase in productivity does not come at a cost
of employment. On the contrary: we find that the inflow of workers increases
more than the outflow does, thus generating a net employment growth of 5
percentage points.
Our results with respect to the productivity effects of PRP are quite robust.
The fixed effects approach proves to be useful for modeling the causal effect
of PRP on productivity. To substantiate the estimated effect it would be worth
applying the model to data that contain more detailed information about the
types of PRP-schemes and the characteristics of workers involved, information
that may be available from linked employer-employee data.
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